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disqualify him from voting for a contract in which he had
such interest. Yet the trend of authority generally is to
the effect that if the interest of a public officer is only indirect the cases are to be considered on their special facts
and are to be held illegal only where there is a lack of
proper disclosure, a fraudulent intent, or where some unfairness exists. III WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, §1735. Nevertheless, our court has held that the slightest interest will disqualify a judge. Findlay v. Smith, 42 W. Va. 299, 26 S. E.
370; Coal Company v. Doolittle, 54 W. Va. 210,46 S. E. 238.
Also, the fact that a juror was an employee of the corporation
which is the prosecuting witness in a larceny case in which
the juror was called to serve was held a sufficient interest to
disqualify him. State v. Dushman, 79 W. Va. 747, 91 S. E.
809. In these cases the law is zealous in its protection of
the individual. By analogy, should the law not protect as
fully the rights of the public to its guarantee of officers acting without personal interest in the business -of the public?
Our court has said that the true intent of the legislature is
the law in construing statutes. Waidron v. Taylor, 52 W.
Va. 284, 45 S. E. 336; State v. Harden, 62 W. Va. 313; 60
S. E. 394; Click v. Click, 98 W. Va. 419, 127 S. E. 194. Every
statute is to be interpreted with reference to the object to
be accomplished. Association v. Sohn, 54 W. Va. 101, 46 S. E.
222. The court found that there was no interest. It is
suggested that this finding is at least doubtful in view of
the fact that the alleged interested member's vote was
necessary to authorize the purchase and since the property
in question adjoins the property of the alleged interested
member. It is further suggested that the public interest
would have been served and the legislative intent satisfied
if such doubt had been resolved in favor of the plaintiffs
in this suit. The precedent here established upon these
facts certainly should not be extended.
-R. Paul Holland.
EVIDENCE-CONFESSIONS-WHAT CONSTITUTES INVOLUNTARINESS.-Defendants, who were accused of murder, were
confined separately and were taken out and questioned
each day for several weeks by a private detective and two
witnesses. They finally made confessions which the state
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introduced as evidence. Defendants objected to the admission of the confessions on the ground that they were
not voluntary. Held, the confessions were admissible. State
v. Richards, 101 W. Va. 136, 132 S. E. 375.
The court seems to have followed the rule laid down in
Smith v. Commonwealth, 10 Grat. (Va.) 734, "A confession
of the prisoner may be given in evidence unless it appears
that it was obtained by some inducement of a worldly or
temporal character, in the nature of a threat or promise of
benefit, held -out to him in respect of his escape from the
consequences of the offense, or the mitigation of the punishment, by a person in authority, or with the apparent sanction of such a person." This rule has been consistently
followed by the West Virginia courts. State v. Morgan, 35 W.
Va. 260; State v. Goldizen, 93 W. Va. 325, 116 S. E. 687;
State v. Zaccario, 100 W. Va. 36, 129 S. E. 736. The
rule is but a statement of the orthodox view on the
subject. "By the middle of the nineteenth century, the
phrase 'threat or promise' had come to be regarded by che
great number of judges as in itself sufficient, and the rule
was frequently laid down that any threat or promise
would exclude a confession, irrespective of any attempt to
measure its influence to cause a false confession." WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE, §825. Regina v. Gibney, Jebb C. C. 15; Regina v.
Moore, 2 Den. C. C. 525 Bartley v. People, 156 Ill. 234, 40
N. E. 831; State v. York, 37 N. H. 183; 18 L. R. A. (N. S.)
768. That the application of this rule has led to some absurd decisions is beyond doubt. The admonition "you had
better confess" uttered by one in authority has been held to
vitiate the resulting confession on the ground that any inducement, however slight, is sufficient to invalidate.
State v. Alexander, 109 La. 557, 30 So. 600; Commonwealth
v. Nott, 135 Mass. 269. So it was formerly held that the
statement "what you say will be used for or against you"
made the subsequent confession bad, the reason given being that the accused might think it was an inducement
to admit guilt. Regina v. Drew, 8 C. & P. 140. And it has
been held that a question directed to the accused, involving
the assumption of his guilt, excluded the resulting confession.
State v. Clarissa,11 Ala. 57. Despite the hopeless confusion
resulting from the application of this rule, the courts have
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almost without exception clung to it. It was thus laid down
in the federal courts until recently. Hansen v. United States,
156 U. S. 51; Hopt v. Utah, 110 U. S. 574. But in 1924 a new
test was formulated for the federal courts. .D was accused
of murder and was subjected to a severe and continuous
questioning, despite the fact that he was very ill. On the thirteenth day, being exhausted, he made a confession, apparently to get rid of his questioners. Nevertheless the Court
of Appeals held the confession admissible on the ground
that it was not procured, by promise or threat-applying
the rule as follbwed by the West Virginia courts. Wan v.
United States, 289 Fed. 908. But on appeal to the United
States Supreme Court the confession was held to be inadmissible. The court broke away from the orthodox rule of
admissibility and laid down a simpler test. It stated that
the requisite of voluntariness was not satisfied by establishing merely that the confession was not induced by threat or
promise, but that it must be voluntary in fact. Wan v. United
States, 266 U. S. 1, 14. It is submitted that this decision shows
a salutary tendency to break away from the mechanical test
of threat or promise, hope or fear. The proper test should be
whether the circumstances attending the confession were
such as to have created in any considerable degree a risk
that a false confession would be made. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE,
§824.
-William Thomas O'Farrell.

SUPREME COURT REVERSES ITSELF ON QUESTION OF PARTY
WALLS-RIGHT OF THE ASSIGNEE COVENANTOR TO SUE.-In a

deed by which the grantor conveyed half of a building to
defendant, it was agreed that the dividing wall should be
a party wall and that either party, or his vendee, was to
have the right to extend the wall higher, and the other
party, or his vendee, was to pay for half of so much of the
wall as he should elect to use. The grantor conveyed the
other half of the building to the plaintiff. The plaintiff
built this wall up another story, placing the joists of defendant's floor in the new wall. Plaintiff then sued defendant for half the cost of the wall. Judgment for defendant below was reversed. A. W. Cox Department Store
v. Solof, 138 S. E. 452 (W. Va. 1927).
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